

A Case for Consolidated Civil Augmentation Programs

A Monograph

by

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ABSTRACT

A CASE FOR CONSOLIDATED CIVIL AUGMENTATION PROGRAMS by MAJOR David T. Culkin, United States Army, 66 pages.

This monograph explores the possibility of consolidating common civil augmentation functions at the Department of Defense level in order to facilitate a more efficient, responsive military. Specifically, the report examines the logistic functions of civil augmentation programs (CAPs) and how they may consolidate to enhance future military capabilities.

For the US military, the core issue consists of the tension between minimizing bureaucratic redundancy and promoting mission capability. The argument calls for an incremental plan toward consolidated CAP structures because streamlined bureaucracy will facilitate more efficient and responsive support using contract functions that are already jointly employed. The US military needs to fight by capability rather than by service role in current and future battle spaces.

Analysis of resource allocation is in the best interests of US forces because it will enhance future military capabilities. Consolidating redundant functions among the individual services, while possibly insulting to cultural pride, may indicate a way to achieve optimal capability effectiveness. The conclusion presents recommendations for CAP consolidation and how they may positively impact military efficacy. There is also an implication that consolidation of common logistic functions may presage further—perhaps even service—consolidation.

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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

This monograph examines the specific logistic functions of civil augmentation programs and how they may consolidate to enhance future military capabilities. For the US military, the core issue consists of the tension between minimizing bureaucratic redundancy and promoting mission capability.

The Issue

Can an incremental consolidation of individual service civil augmentation programs enhance the US military's ability to respond more flexibly to contemporary security challenges? While current military structure has supported ongoing operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, there is concern that it will be unable to sustain the high operational tempo in two simultaneous theaters. A recent study by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) concluded that redundant hierarchy in the Department of Defense (DoD) during a period of scarce resources can be detrimental in the long term:

“Too often, the current organizational structure of the Military Departments, the Joint Staff, and the Office of Secretary of Defense (OSD) unnecessarily overlap, resulting in duplicative and, in some instances, overly large staffs that require wasteful coordination processes and impede necessary innovation.”¹

Can the US military, in its current configuration, support expected deployment loads in the future?

Several viewpoints claim it is possible. These viewpoints center on the military's past and recent operational successes. Operation Desert Storm, for example, has been cited as proof that the US political-military infrastructure has overcome the problems of Vietnam: burdensome service rivalry, civilian micro-management, and piecemealed employment. Furthermore, any

¹ Clark A. Murdock, et al, *Beyond Goldwater-Nichols, Phase 1 Report* (Washington, DC: CSIS, March 2004), 7.

attempt to merge unique services would, like multi-use weapons that lose specificity, lead inevitably to dulling the spear tip of military effectiveness. Military inter-service rivalry traditionally has motivated members to hone individual and collective skills. Decentralized missions during Operations Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and Enduring Freedom (OEF) may produce a generation of military leaders who are accustomed to using initiative and innovation rather than overwhelming might and resources during future conflicts. Some may argue that service contract programs, if consolidated, would reduce the flexibility to respond to increasingly difficult contingencies. Finally, the *argumentum ad antiquitam* suggests that functioning institutions do not need repair.

While the US military is the most capable conventional force in the world, the fact that it has innovated and continues to reform in response to dynamic environments provides reason to assess its current efficiency versus effectiveness. Can it accomplish strategic and operational objectives while using the minimum required assets, abbreviated planning times, and streamlined support structures? Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, in issuing planning guidance leading up to OEF and OIF, notoriously proclaimed that DoD planners need to take less time, focus on accurate assumptions, and assume more risk by reducing time and personnel.² Like other self-aware institutions, the DoD has attempted to apply lessons learned to improve future operations. There is no reason to assume the military will not continue to reform in order to better protect national security interests.

This paper will analyze the potential for the incremental consolidation of US military civil augmentation programs (CAPs). Key assumptions help set the parameters for coherent analysis and guide the research: consolidation will require an incremental, not revolutionary, approach in which reform occurs no faster than service transformation; improvements in

² Bob Woodward, *Plan of Attack* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2004), 34-5.

transformation come from enhanced capabilities; individual military services will retain their identities; and more efficient support functions (e.g., consolidated CAPs) will provide combat forces a greater opportunity to perform more effectively in the battle space. These assumptions focus the scope of the inquiry on fundamental issues. A spear analogy may facilitate issue analysis: the tip represents the combat capabilities the services bring to the modern battlefield, and the shaft represents the service support and command-control structures that directly support combat capabilities. In its current configuration, this spear has a sharp tip but rather unwieldy shaft that is composed of four armed services that are loosely tethered. Factors such as parochial disputes over limited budgets, research and development, and heightened deployment requirements keep these shafts unbalanced. A future, ideal spear would entail a sharpened tip with the tempered shaft as a tightly bound composite that strengthens the overall killing effect of the spear. To explore this innovation, the following analytical framework will be used: history, doctrine, structure and culture, and operations.

The Context

CAP developed out of a need by the military to more effectively support operations during periods of reduced resources. The Army instituted the first CAP in the late 1980s to use contracting support as a means to provide essential services—e.g., recreation, facility management, runway construction—so that a maximum number of uniformed personnel would be available for combat missions. The Navy, Marines, and Air Force, by 1997, had established similar contingency programs that address the same problems in service-centric manners. The desire to enhance the efficiency of support functions continues to characterize defense reform. Current initiatives in “focused logistics,”³ for example, have demonstrated a perceived need to

³ Joint Chiefs of Staff, Chairman, *Joint Vision 2020* (Washington, DC: USGPO, June 2000), 30.

enhance the effectiveness of joint logistics structures. Allies, such as Canada, have also discovered the value of increased jointness, particularly in support functions.

There is a continued trend toward consolidating the logistic capabilities to better serve the services. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs has espoused the operational concept of focused logistics to help hone this capability. “Logistics” is a general term that refers to functions that support operational forces. Martin Van Creveld describes the concept in this manner: “the practical art of moving armies and keeping them supplied.”⁴ “Focused logistics” deliberately links “the operator and logistician across Services and support agencies.”⁵ The term “civil augmentation programs” is largely absent in joint publications, perhaps due to their service-centric focus. These programs are a form of external theater support which provides commonly pre-arranged contract services for “deployed operational forces working pursuant to contracts awarded under the command and procurement authority of supporting headquarters outside the theater.”⁶ The primary service-run civil augmentation programs are the Army’s Logistic Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP), the Air Force Contract Augmentation Program (AFCAP), and the Navy’s Construction Capabilities Contract (CONCAP). The joint definition of “flexible response” helps codify a necessary function: “The capability of military forces for effective reaction to any enemy threat or attack with actions appropriate and adaptable to the circumstances existing.”⁷ The label, “joint,” refers to any planning or operation that employs one or more

⁴ Van Creveld, Martin, *Supplying War: Logistics from Wallenstein to Patton* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), 1. He discusses the limits of logistics and how they impact the feasibility of operations (3).

⁵ *Joint Vision 2020*, 30.

⁶ Amy Burris, et al, “Contractor Support in the Theater of Operations: Deskbook Supplement” (Washington, DC: 28 March 2001), Paragraph 4.2. This informal handbook, though not prescriptive, offers a glimpse into the functional world of joint contracting. It identifies the three categories of contract support: systems support, external theater support, and theater support (Paragraph 4.0). Other CAP programs include the war reserve materiel (WRM) contracts and the civil reserve air fleet (CRAF) which, due to this paper’s scope, will not be considered.

⁷ Joint Staff (J7), Department of Defense, *JP 1-02: Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms* (12 April 2001, as amended through 5 September 2003, on-line at

uniformed service. *Title X*, United States Code, provides a definition of “contingency operation:...is designated by the Secretary of Defense as an operation in which members of the armed forces are or may become involved in military actions, operations, or hostilities against an enemy of the United States or against an opposing military force.”⁸ The concept of consolidating civil augmentation programs (CAPs) describes the process of placing units, training, education, doctrine, and resources for CAP of the separate services under the control of DoD in order to better support peacetime and wartime operations. An incremental plan toward consolidated military structures has legislative precedent, is critical to long-term national security, and makes sense.

The current structure of US military forces could reorganize to exploit the long-term flexibility that the dynamic contemporary global environment requires. Given the ongoing Global War on Terrorism and transformation, the US military has an opportunity to adapt and become more responsive to the challenges of a fluid contemporary security environment. The military daily faces the challenges of applying limited resources to expanding mission requirements: overextended logistics, Congressional debates on service end strengths, and base closures. Recent episodes during Operation Iraqi Freedom (e.g., threats to lines of logistic support as front-line units assaulted Baghdad) demonstrate that the modern battlefield is more demanding than ever in terms of resources—especially in terms of rear-area security. While missions are still accomplished, there is an increasing drain on limited resources which may preclude future mission accomplishment. Multiple extended deployments, for example, will continue to strain the military until it is incapable of other missions. The ambiguity of today’s world coupled with the unknown defense challenges of the future provide reason enough to

<http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/doddct/data/f/index.html>). This definition and publication are also referenced in *JFSC Pub-1*.

⁸ United States Code, *Title 10—Armed Forces* (Washington, DC: US Congress, 10 August 1956), Section 101.

ensure the military is as flexible as it can be.⁹ The purpose of this monograph is to explore the possibility of consolidating common civil augmentation functions at the Department of Defense level in order to facilitate the development of a more efficient, responsive military.

CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW

The US military will need to fight future conflicts by capability rather than by service. Existing literature on military reorganization and role reform is quite extensive, particularly in legislative actions. Historical records of operational missions provide indicators of how effectively linked were military forces to strategic goals. Doctrinal references demonstrate that the individual services will often approach the same problem/issue differently, often leading to unnecessary discord on even minor issues. Service parochialism within the DoD tends to reinforce the traditional service cultures and their rivalries, a trend that espouses élan but can be detrimental to departmental effectiveness. Finally, a review of ongoing operations and force capabilities will highlight some of the capability gaps that exist among the services. Crossing those gaps will help enhance presidential option development and military effectiveness more than preserving unlinked service capabilities.

The Characteristics of Joint Battle Space

The Department of Defense has expended tremendous amounts of energy in developing theories to explain the characteristics of the battle space not only of today but of tomorrow as well. The result is a conglomeration of observations and recommendations from several disciplines and agencies. While the effort, largely energized by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs

⁹ Christopher Gabel, Ph.D., Written review of essay outline (Fort Leavenworth: CGSC, December 2003). Dr. Gabel provided advice for a related article for publication, particularly in terms of how to resent the argument for incrementalism and to promote the military's "big war" capabilities.

of Staff (CJCS), continues, current publications clearly indicate trends for future developments.

Future military operations will tend to require a military that operates jointly, collaborates with other agencies and nations, and flexibly exploits capabilities through agile thinking.

The context in which nation-states have conducted affairs has become a very fluid environment. Michael Evans discusses how the international arena has dramatically changed from the traditional Westphalian nation-state system to one with far more non-state and trans-state actors than ever before. In this highly charged environment, he believes future forces must employ adaptive strategy, analyze vulnerabilities and consequences, utilize “diplomatic cooperation,” and apply “new norms of international law” that would allow pre-emptive operations.¹⁰ He observes, “To meet the challenges of tomorrow’s wars, Western countries will need highly mobile, well equipped, and versatile forces capable of multidimensional coalition missions and ‘mastery of violence’ across a complex spectrum of conflict.”¹¹ A military operating in this highly charged environment will need to be increasingly flexible, able to respond to various situations—sometimes simultaneously. Organizations such as the Joint Staff have considered how military forces must morph in response to this dynamism.

In *An Evolving Perspective: US Joint Warfare and Crisis Resolution in the 21st Century*, the Joint Staff and DoD have tried to better understand the skill sets that the contemporary military must possess. The document highlights the key characteristics and capabilities that the joint US military will require to face future challenges in the security environment. The endorsement¹² of the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) further substantiates this vision of transformation. This paper initially outlines the characteristics and capabilities of the

¹⁰ Michael Evans, “From Kadesh to Kandahar: Military Theory and the Future of War” (On-line: <http://www.nwc.Navy.mil/press/Review/2003/Summer/art6-su3.htm>, 15 pages, issued during SAMS curriculum), 11.

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² Joint Staff, J-7, *An Evolving Perspective: US Joint Warfare and Crisis Resolution in the 21st Century* (Washington, DC: Joint Staff, 28 January 2003), iii.

joint force in the 21st century: synergistic employment of all services from both reserve and active components; key employment of forces at the operational level; leaders will leverage service capabilities for unified effort; “incorporate *necessary capability redundancy with minimal duplication*;” synchronized with interagency and integrated with multinational partners.¹³ Specifically, joint teams will have to respond to crises and be able to conduct forcible entry, global projection, sustainment for extended periods, synchronized operations in which different units employ unity of effort, and continuous C4ISR.¹⁴ The paper notes that cultural change is required to effect the “expeditionary and joint team mindset:” “this mindset must permeate all aspects of future joint and Service force design, doctrine, capabilities, organization, training, equipment, deployment, employment, and sustainment.”¹⁵ As a result of tailored forces with more dynamic commitments, future joint forces may increasingly rely upon the resources of sister services to accomplish missions.

The US Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) has developed a theory that considers the various threats the US will face and the capabilities it needs to neutralize them. The document, *The Joint Operational Environment—Into the Future*, provides the joint staff’s theory of the future security environment and its expected challenges. The analysis cogently outlines the key characteristics of future military operations in the joint environment: increased operations in complex terrain; maritime operations in the littorals; amplified information operations and warfare; widespread space operations; vulnerabilities of air power to widely proliferated SAM systems; intense struggle for access to areas of operation; continued political limitations on force employment; increasingly fractious coalitions and alliances; difficulty in matching rules of engagement to varied areas of responsibility; diverse and global media interaction; and

¹³ Ibid., 4.

¹⁴ Ibid., 11. C4ISR = Command, Control, Computers, Communications, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance.

¹⁵ Ibid.

asymmetric threats to friendly vulnerabilities.¹⁶ These characteristics help provide a framework upon which national security policy can build. The 9/11 Commission attempted to make recommendations that would aid this process.

The 9/11 Commission recently had to contend with some of the persistent issues of bureaucratic consolidation. While centralizing planning and authority may result in a more responsive structure, there may result “too much power in one place.”¹⁷ The commission concludes that institutional reforms will not eliminate interagency conflict or the continued need for collaboration. Perhaps this is a good thing in that friction—the very thing consolidation would attempt to mitigate—tends to guarantee checks and balances. Reforms that result in consolidation, while not erasing department identities, may allow the government to respond to contemporary challenges with adequate levels of efficiency. The commission recognizes the difficulty of implementing such reform, but it acknowledges the US has conducted significant transformation before and during war—e.g., defense reforms at the end of World War II and during the Korean Conflict. “Countering transnational Islamist terrorism will test whether the U.S. government can fashion more flexible models of management needed to deal with the twenty-first century world.”¹⁸ In short, there are costs and benefits to institutional reform that must be assessed prior to implementation.

History

The US military has demonstrated it is the most powerful, most capable force in the world. However, institutional reviews consistently find a need for reform to better meet the

¹⁶ United States Joint Forces Command, *The Joint Operational Environment—Into the Future*, Coordinating Draft (USJFCOM, 5 March 2004), 86-99. This theoretical concept was further developed during seminar discussion under Dr. Schneider.

¹⁷ The 9/11 Commission, *Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States* (Washington, DC: USGPO, 2004, Official government edition), 406.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*

expectations of decision makers and elected officials. McMaster's analysis of the Pentagon's "efficiency" during the Vietnam era, for example, concludes that the military advisory system in the joint chiefs had broken down. The Johnson Administration was rife with parochialism; and the chiefs, unwilling to confront their president, resolved to promote service-centric solutions to multi-faceted issues.¹⁹ The 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act attempted to ameliorate the shortcomings of organizations that had been overburdened since the world wars. Meinhart examines how three Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS)—Generals Powell, Shalikashvili, and Shelton—used the joint strategic planning system and the empowerment tendered by the Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 to effectively address increasingly frequent and strategically influential operations throughout the 1990s. Almost twenty years after the legislation, the CSIS team has concluded that still more reform is needed to meet the needs of national security in an information age—rather than "cold war:"

"…the Department of Defense (DoD) must adapt not only to the post-Cold War, post-9/11 security environment but also must cope with many 'hidden failures' that, while not preventing operational success, stifle necessary innovation and continue to squander critical resources in terms of time and money."²⁰

The call for reform and strategic thinking is not new to military philosophy.

Military theorists have, throughout the ages, cited a need for innovation. Their justification has normally entailed the potential for improvement: increased effectiveness while using fewer resources. Changes in battlefield environments have particularly stressed the importance of agility. Lao Tzu noted the criticality of flexible response centuries ago: "An Army that is inflexible will not conquer; / A tree that is inflexible will snap."²¹ In the modern era, several theorists have decided that battle space has become more intimately involved with civilian

¹⁹ H.R. McMaster, *Dereliction of Duty* (New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 1997), 261. This comment was incorporated from a paper I wrote for A512, *National Security Policy*, CGSC, April 2004.

²⁰ Murdock, 6.

²¹ Lao Tzu, *Tao Te Ching*, Victor H. Mair (Trans., annotated) (New York: Bantam Books, 1990), 52 (Chapter 76).

population centers. Roger Trinquier, the noted proponent for counterinsurgency, agrees with Mao Tse-tung in that populations have become the key to orchestrating military victory. He ventures to redefine warfare: “In modern warfare, we are not actually grappling with an Army organized along traditional lines, but with a few armed elements acting clandestinely within a population manipulated by a special organization.”²² Some contemporary American leaders have argued for focusing on service capabilities rather than on roles. Merrill McPeak, a former Air Force Chief of Staff, poses that while airpower is dominant in the modern battle space, the key to future success is the ability “to imagine how our combat effectiveness might be dramatically improved by bold, non-incremental change.”²³ While there has been a seemingly unified call for innovation, much debate has centered on how change should occur and what form should military organizations assume.

Military theorists have studied how organizational structure affects military effectiveness on the battlefield—whether in the air, at sea, or on land. Arguments have ranged from defense forces unified under a single command structure to the establishment and preservation of separate services under strong civilian authority. This range of concepts describes the parameters of theoretical discussion regarding military reorganization used in this paper.

The idea of the unification of services and military capabilities has had particular appeal. Giulio Douhet, a founding father of modern airpower theory, observed the communication and operational problems that resulted from service rivalry between the Italian Army and Navy at the turn of the twentieth century. He made the controversial proposal of “the establishment of a

²² Roger Trinquier, *Modern Warfare: A French View of Counterinsurgency* (London: Pall Mall Press, 1964), 8. This was issued to A699 as a CSI reprint, USACGSC, in 2004.

²³ Merrill A. McPeak, “Leave the Flying To Us,” in *Washington Post* (Washington, D.C., June 5, 2003), 33-4. On-line version.

single ministry of defense headed by a civilian.”²⁴ He believed that one could only understand warfare as a whole—not divided among spheres of land, sea, and air. “He therefore proposed a national war college to educate soldiers, sailors, and airmen in the overall conduct of war.”²⁵ The suggested consolidation of training and support services seems quite reasonable; however, he perhaps went too far in suggesting the consolidation of service budgets.²⁶ Service unification sounds clean and efficient, yet there has been a tension between potential efficiency and the retention of service identities.

In the United States, debate over consolidation of the military structure arose during the World War II era. Leaders such as Senator Truman and Chief of Staff of the Army Marshall advocated “unification” of the three services under one department.²⁷ This became the genesis of the National Security Act of 1947 which created the Department of Defense and an independent Air Force. Not surprisingly, many senior officers resented the reorganization because it threatened their service identities and set the conditions for congressional budget cuts.²⁸ As early as 1944, the House Committee on Post-War Military Policy heard testimony from several civilian and military leaders and concluded that any reform in the defense establishment would not be immediate or short-term. “While a number of the witnesses supported the idea of a consolidation of the armed services, they were practically unanimous in feeling that no comprehensive or revolutionizing changes should be made at this critical period in the war.”²⁹ This historical

²⁴ Phillip S. Meilinger (Ed.), *The Paths of Heaven* (Maxwell AFB, AL: The School of Advanced Airpower Studies, Air University Press, 1997), 31.

²⁵ Meilinger, 32.

²⁶ Meilinger, 32.

²⁷ Douglas T. Stuart (Ed.), *Organizing for National Security* (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2000), 9-10.

²⁸ Stuart, 11.

²⁹ House Select Committee on Post-War Military Policy, *House Resolution 465: A Resolution Creating a Select Committee on Post-War Military Policy*, House Report 1645, Vol. 4, Ser. 10847 (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1944), 3.

record exemplifies a stubborn resistance to change in the US defense establishment, particularly in times of hostilities—as is the current situation.

The National Security Act of 1947 constituted watershed legislation in terms of the degree of its reforms to the national defense establishment. By creating the Department of Defense and a Secretary of Defense to oversee the combined efforts of the individual services, the act laid the groundwork for future functional reforms. The Secretary of Defense was given a responsibility to take “appropriate steps to eliminate unnecessary duplication or overlapping the fields of procurement, supply, transportation, storage, health, and research.”³⁰ The reforms also instituted joint boards such as the National Security Resources Board and the Munitions Board which were forerunners of the current Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC). These forums attempted to optimize the efficiency and effort of several agencies in support of national policy and strategy. For example, roles assigned to the Munitions Board clearly imply an intent to unify effort: “to recommend assignment of procurement responsibilities among the several military services and....to make recommendations to regroup, combine, or dissolve existing interservice agencies...to promote efficiency and economy.”³¹ The congressional leaders of 1947 perceived that a primary problem was “the maximum economy in money, material, and manpower compatible with military efficiency.”³²

The reformers in 1947 also saw the incremental nature of defense institutional reforms. Sections on “Congressional Comments” in the act describe various studies conducted after the world wars to examine “the urgent need for bringing to the military departments in peacetime a large measure of the unity and commonness of purpose which characterize the operations of the

³⁰ 80th Congress, 1st Session, *United States Code: National Security Act of 1947* (St. Paul, Minnesota: West Publishing Co., 1947), Ch 343, Pub. 253, Sec 202, p. 503.

³¹ *Ibid.*, Sec. 213, 509.

³² *Ibid.*, 1489.

armed forces in time of war.”³³ While there has been little debate in determining “the need of a single unifying organization [such as the DoD] to assure complete teamwork between the military arms for efficiency in operation and economy in the use of our resources,”³⁴ the decision making has often been contentious and slow. It is reasonable to conclude that defense reform—although cumbersome and deliberate—is possible, and consolidation to enhance the efficiency of resource usage has precedent.

There have been concerns voiced anytime the consolidation of service capabilities has arisen. Retired General Carl Mundy, USMC, has outlined several “caution lights” that warn of misinterpretation of the Goldwater-Nichols legislation. He notes that a unified military force is negative in that it could detract from effective capabilities.

“Remember that effective jointness means blending the distinct colors of the services into a rainbow of synergistic military effectiveness. It does not suggest pouring them into a single jar and mixing them until they lose their individual properties and come out as a colorless paste. No Army that has worn purple uniforms ever won a battle. Balanced military judgment and combat effectiveness depend upon service individuality, culture, training, and interpretation of the battlefield. The essence of jointness is the flexible blending of service individualities.”³⁵

Mundy, however, leaves it to the reader to determine the “individual” service characteristics that may unite to make a more effective joint force. Admiral William Crowe, the first CJCS under Goldwater-Nichols, has indicated the Navy’s traditional opposition to anything that would detract from its unique role. He specifically opposed the act’s Title Four provision for a cadre of joint specialty officers because it would lead to “congressional micromanagement.”³⁶ The perceived threat to service responsibilities and security has most commonly muffled calls for service

³³ Ibid.

³⁴ Ibid.

³⁵ Carl E. Mundy, “Cautions on Goldwater-Nichols,” in *Joint Force Quarterly*, Autumn 1996, Number 13 (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University), 21.

³⁶ William J. Crowe, Jr. with David Chanoff, *The Line of Fire* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1993), 158.

consolidation. A look at service doctrine, however, may indicate a further need to consolidate capabilities.

Doctrine

Each uniformed service has its own series of manuals and regulations pertaining to an entire spectrum of daily and episodic operations: from uniform wear to shipboard operations. Since Goldwater-Nichols, the joint staff has made a concerted effort to publish joint manuals in order to provide a baseline doctrine (read, “operating language”). Whether joint manuals are intended to replace correlating service manuals may be open to debate. However, the disparate treatment of critical concepts among service publications implies a clear need to further consolidate service doctrine—in general and in terms of joint contracting in particular.

One critical conceptual term, for example, is “center of gravity.” While much significance has been attributed to the term with the rise of asymmetric warfare, there is little agreement on its definition. Several authors have defined this term within their specialty areas; the result, however, has been “muddled waters” that have not led to “...a common understanding of a concept critical to a ‘Joint’ DOD community....”³⁷ The 1986 version of the Army *Field Manual 100-5 Operations* had a comprehensive, yet unfocused definition of the term; the *Air Force Manual 1-1* of 1992 provided four definitions of the term; and both the Marine *FMFM 1 Warfighting* (1989) and John Warden’s *The Air Campaign* (1988) actually equated centers of gravity with critical vulnerabilities.³⁸ Dr. Joe Strange suggests that such confused language can lead to severe operational problems and deter mutual understanding: “Just because the term ‘center of gravity’ means different things to aircraft pilots, mechanical engineers, and ship drivers

³⁷ Joe Strange, *Centers of Gravity & Critical Vulnerabilities: Building on the Clausewitzian Foundation So That We Can All Speak the Same Language*, No. 4, 2nd ed. (Quantico: Marine Corps University Foundation, 1996), 41.

³⁸ Strange, 32-8.

(center of buoyancy), that does not justify it meaning different things to soldiers, airmen, sailors, and Marines.”³⁹ He suggests that different specialties within the military do not invalidate the need for a common-use lexicon of terms and principles. This premise, in addition to the economic appeal, may also imply a justification for more joint schools.

The individual services provide the most detailed information regarding their specific civil augmentation programs. These programs have several capabilities, many of which overlap one another. Below are general descriptions of the legal parameters, current programs, their capabilities, and areas in which they overlap or underlap. Appendix A provides a detailed listing of service CAP functions. Joint doctrine is rather sparse on specific service functions, and it summarily reviews program capabilities. The lack of doctrine addressing integrated civil augmentation programs which support jointly employed forces indicates that defense leadership will have to conceptualize a unified vision and then communicate the intent for such operations. Consolidation requires more than a common language; it means reformed thinking and institutions that support innovation.

Legal Parameters

Current federal laws and regulations require a military that is efficient while maintaining service boundaries in a vertically hierarchical structure. United States Code (USC), *Title X*, and various executive directives provide the base parameters within which the DoD must function. While these documents respect service identities, they also clearly indicate that forces must operate jointly, often in multinational environments, through the efficient employment of available resources. Joint contracting, and CAP in particular, plays a large role in this legal framework.

³⁹ Strange, 41. The bold-face replicates Dr. Strange’s version. He further defines “centers of gravity” as “primary sources of moral or physical strength, power and resistance” (43).

Title X specifies the duty of the Secretary of Defense to economically use personnel to organize for optimal efficacy. He/she “shall use the least costly form of personnel consistent with military requirements and other needs of the Department.”⁴⁰ The law further directs the Secretary to “consider particularly the advantages of converting from one form of personnel (military, civilian, or private contract) to another for the performance of a specified job.”⁴¹ In other words, it is a legal responsibility of the Secretary of Defense to manage his/her department as efficiently as possible. For civil augmentation programs, this could mean eliminating “unnecessary duplications”⁴² such as triplicate service programs, creating a joint program, or placing one service as lead agent for specific missions. Thus, it is under the Secretary’s legal purview to consolidate the civil augmentation program functions at the department level in order to enhance the economic feasibility and operational responsiveness of the US armed forces.

DODD 5100.1 defines the various components and roles within the Department of Defense. The section, “Functions of Combatant Commanders,” specifies that combatant commanders are routinely expected to integrate and employ personnel and equipment from all services to support their missions. Combatant commanders will “coordinate and approve those aspects of administration, support (including control of resources and equipment, internal organization, and training), and discipline necessary to carry out missions assigned to the command....”⁴³ Furthermore, the directive documents common functions shared by the services. Among them, Paragraph 6.5.5 states that each service must “provide logistic support for Service forces, including procurement, distribution, supply, equipment, and maintenance....”⁴⁴ Services

⁴⁰ United States Code, *Title 10—Armed Forces* (Washington, DC: US Congress, 10 August 1956), Section 129a.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*

⁴² *Ibid.*, Section 113, Item c1.

⁴³ Department of Defense, *Department of Defense Directive (DODD) 5100.1* (Washington, DC: OSD, 1 August 2002), 9, Paragraph 5.1.6.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 12.

not only have a cultural but also a legal motivation to separately provide support to their respective forces. The civil augmentation programs such as LOGCAP, AFCAP, and CONCAP help fulfill these support roles.

LOGCAP

LOGCAP began in 1985 to employ contract services to augment existing service support capabilities. “The guiding principle of LOGCAP is to preplan for the use of global corporate resources as an alternative in support of contingency operations and to augment combat support and combat service support force structures when identified shortfalls exist.”⁴⁵ Kolar examines the contract structures the US Army Corps of Engineers had to use in response to each unique situation. The program allows Army engineers, managers, logisticians, and other service support personnel to support operational missions while civilian contractors—using primarily pre-arranged contracts—provide critical infrastructure, construction, recreation, and managerial support.

The Army’s civil augmentation program specifically addresses planning for using contractors during wartime. The program’s objective is to

“preplan for the use of civilian contractors to perform selected services in wartime to augment Army forces. Utilization of civilian contractors in a theater of operation will release military units for other missions or fill shortfalls. This provides the Army with an additional means to adequately support the current and programmed [sic] force.”⁴⁶

Specific planning objectives include the resolution of combat support and service support unit shortfalls, provision of rapid contracting capability not addressed by current contingency plans,

⁴⁵ Nicholas J. Kolar, Jr., “LOGCAP: Providing Vital Services to Soldiers,” in *Engineer Professional Bulletin* (March 1997), 1. Issued through CGSC during SAMS. LTC Kolar provides a good overview of the LOGCAP program—its history, employment, and facilitation of strategic projection.

⁴⁶ Department of the Army, *Army Regulation 700-137: Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP)* (Washington, DC: Headquarters, DA, 16 December 1985), 3.

and provision of contract augmentation during mobilization in CONUS.⁴⁷ Planners must assume that contractor participation is voluntary and involves greater operational risk.⁴⁸

At the same time, LOGCAP provides a force multiplier for government service providers. For example, LOGCAP operations in 1999 were successful in East Timor—a multi-national situation. The contractor provided what the Army could not: a relatively small footprint in theater for an indefinite period.⁴⁹ Contractors worked closely with US Pacific Command (PACOM, a joint unified command) to provide heavy-lift helicopter support, helipad and access-ramp construction, and logistic support in a remote area bereft of resources. The received contract support saved PACOM from deploying the 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit, Navy ships, marine aircraft, and possibly an Army heavy-lift helicopter company with requisite support personnel and equipment.⁵⁰ Additionally, political agreements had limited the military presence, obviating the occupation of a military airfield during the mission.⁵¹ Considering that the contractor, DynCorp, had to bring in most of its supplies—including building an on-site concrete mixing facility—the contract saved the US military several resources. Contracted Mi-26 helicopters from Russia and Slovakia, for example, “flew over 475 hours transporting more than 6,400 personnel and 845 tons of materiel and supplies.”⁵²

Recently, the LOGCAP awarded Halliburton Kellogg Brown & Root (KBR) the contract to provide the Army support during Iraqi reconstruction efforts. The contract tasks Halliburton to

⁴⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁸ Ibid., 4.

⁴⁹ James Folk and Andy Smith, “A LOGCAP Success in East Timor,” in *Army Logistian* (Fort Lee: JUL/AUG 2000, Vol. 32, Iss. 4, pp. 38-42), 3. On-line via ProQuest, 6 pages. The program specifically provides construction, MWR, food/water service, logistic, and recreation support for deployed or deploying units in theater.

⁵⁰ Ibid.

⁵¹ Ibid.

⁵² Ibid., 4.

provide basic construction, RSOI, food / water services, transportation, and storage support.⁵³

The Army is holding the contractor to terms that support strategic deployment: “LOGCAP III is a 10-year task-order contract with a 1-year base period and nine 1-year options. The contract requires Halliburton KBR to deploy within 72 hours of notification and to deliver combat support and combat service support for 25,000 troops within 15 days.”⁵⁴ Such capabilities allow US military forces to strategically deploy and reserve more personnel for operational missions. That most contracts are pre-arranged translates into very efficient timelines that provide critical support to troops.

AFCAP

The Air Force Contract Augmentation Program provides the Air Force a unique ability to sustain its critical support operations. Air Force doctrine describes AFCAP as “a means of obtaining commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) items and contractor support.”⁵⁵ Founded to help provide service support while coping with institutional personnel shortages; AFCAP regularly offers construction, recreation, and air traffic service support. Unlike LOGCAP, however, the Air Force tends to employ uniformed personnel as a first response and then brings in contractors under AFCAP for long-term sustainment.

AFCAP, like the other CAPs, is available to other services and government agencies. The main purpose of such programs is to provide the US military support for contingency response.

“The role of AFCAP is to provide military commanders with a way to augment or relieve their forces involved in military operations other than war or to support recovery from natural disasters, accidents, or terrorist attacks. Typically, military

⁵³ “Army Awards LOGCAP III Contract,” in *Army Logistian* (Fort Lee: MAR/APR 2002, Vol. 34, Iss. 2), 40. On-line via ProQuest.

⁵⁴ Ibid.

⁵⁵ Department of the Air Force, *Air Force Instruction 10-204: Readiness Exercises and After-Action Reporting Program* (Washington, DC: HQUSAF, 1 May 2002), 9.

units provide the initial response to an event, then call upon AFCAP for ongoing support as needed.”⁵⁶

While AFCAP often provides air-specific services such as runway construction and air traffic control, it also provides generic services such as facilities maintenance and infrastructure reconstruction.

The cost-effectiveness of civil augmentation retains the program’s attractiveness for commanders and planners alike. AFCAP contractors in earthquake recovery efforts in India in January 2001, for example, saved the “government some \$666,000 in purchasing costs.”⁵⁷ The Air Force’s keystone combat support doctrine infers that commanders and logistical planners have the task of considering the balance between what deploying forces must carry and what they can locally procure.⁵⁸ Civil augmentation contracting, as opposed to other forms of contracting, helps military leaders fill in these gaps of force capabilities when services are short personnel.

CONCAP

The Contingency Construction Capabilities Contract (CONCAP, begun in 1995) is designed to provide the US Navy and Marine Corps civilian construction engineer support in order to defray the costs of taking uniformed personnel from ongoing missions. CONCAP provides the Navy and Marine Corps with “responsive engineering and construction capabilities for a wide range of construction missions.”⁵⁹ In 2004, the Navy awarded Kellogg, Brown, and Root, a division of Halliburton Company, its current contract which is expected not to exceed

⁵⁶ “Case Study: AFCAP: Unstructured Thinking,” in *Building Design & Construction* (Chicago: May 2003), 60, on-line via ProQuest), 2 of 3.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, 2-3.

⁵⁸ Department of the Air Force, *Air Force Doctrine Document 2-4: Combat Support* (Washington, DC: Headquarters, AFDC, 22 November 1999), 6.

⁵⁹ Joint Staff, *Joint Publication 4-04: Joint Doctrine for Civil Engineering Support* (Washington, DC: Joint Staff, 27 September 2001, on-line at http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new_pubs/jp4_04.pdf), V-8.

\$500 million over the next five years.⁶⁰ Bruce Stanski, Senior Vice President of Government Operations for the contractor, credits CONCAP's success to its versatility:

“Under the previous CONCAP contract awarded in 2001, KBR performed repairs following a typhoon in Guam; constructed detention facilities in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba; constructed and repaired airfield runways in Italy and Spain; constructed and repaired a breakwater facility in Azores; and constructed military and civilian facilities in Kuwait and Iraq.”⁶¹

CONCAP, a versatile program managed by the US Navy, provides construction and engineering support worldwide to all military services.⁶²

The naval logistics doctrine is rather scanty; however, it addresses the Construction Capabilities (CONCAP) Program as contingency contracting that focuses on engineering support.⁶³ The program, run by the Naval Facilities Engineering Command (NAVFAC), helps support organic naval and marine engineer units: Marine—division combat engineer battalions, wing support squadrons, and the engineer support battalion; Navy—civil engineers, naval construction force units (“Seabees”), and advanced base functional components (ABFC).⁶⁴ For what CONCAP cannot provide, other DoD programs can assist.

Naval doctrine provides naval operators guidelines for managing logistic operations during expeditionary missions. Naval engineers can expect to use LOGCAP assets from the Army if necessary to support construction operations—particularly as a means to quickly activate and operate logistic sites.⁶⁵ The Navy considers CONCAP an augmentation for existing engineer capabilities. These capabilities are very similar to LOGCAP and AFCAP functions. “A

⁶⁰ Halliburton Company, “KBR Chosen to Continue Supporting U.S. Navy Under CONCAP Contract,” *2004 Press Releases* (Houston: KBR Public Relations, 27 July 2004, on-line: http://www.halliburton.com/news/archive/2004/kbrnws_072704.jsp), 1.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*

⁶² *JP 4-04*, V-8.

⁶³ Department of the Navy, *Naval Doctrine Publication 4: Naval Logistics* (Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Naval Operations and Headquarters US Marine Corps, 20 February 2001), 18.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, 13.

⁶⁵ Department of the Navy, *Naval Warfare Publication 4-01.1: Navy Expeditionary Shore-based Logistic Support and Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, and Integration (RSOI) Operations* (Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, September 2003), Paragraph 4.4.2.3.1.

CONCAP contract is a cost plus award fee, indefinite delivery, indefinite quantity contract vehicle for contingency construction, engineering, and related services anywhere in the world.”⁶⁶ It covers roads and bridges, ammunitions storage facilities, power plants and power generation, communications facilities, supply warehouses, and medical facilities.⁶⁷ Naval contracting, along with that of other services, has improved its degree of flexible response through the civil augmentation program.

To reiterate the discussion, each of the service civil augmentation programs—particularly LOGCAP, AFCAP, and CONCAP—provides combatant commanders external theater contract support. They provide the commanders tools to solve the same problem: How can a military organization continue to accomplish its mission requirements when available personnel, materiel, and other resources are increasingly scarce? Civilian contractor support offers the DoD a readily available resource pool that can provide critical logistic and infrastructure support while allowing uniformed members to support more time-critical operations.

A consequence of contractor effectiveness has been the increased presence of civilian contractors in battle space. *Joint Publication 4-0: Doctrine for Logistic Support of Joint Operations*, explains how contractors have become a force multiplier for combatant commanders: “Contractor support can augment existing capabilities, provide expanded sources of supplies and services, bridge gaps in the deployed force structure, leverage assets, and reduce dependence on US-based logistics.”⁶⁸ While there are some unique characteristics of the separate service programs, they help the DoD to provide national defense.

⁶⁶ Ibid., Paragraph 4.4.2.3.2.

⁶⁷ Ibid.

⁶⁸ Joint Staff, *Joint Publication 4-0: Doctrine for Logistic Support of Joint Operations* (Washington, DC: Joint Staff, 6 April 2000), V-1, paragraph 1.

Structure and Culture

There is much debate concerning the direction the military should take to face future challenges. Some experts believe the forces must be strengthened in certain capabilities. Others claim that greater effectiveness with reconfigured forces is the key. Douglas Macgregor, for example, declares the importance of streamlining future force structures. He foresees a joint expeditionary force structure.⁶⁹ Successful revision—mental as well as physical—will enhance performance efficacy, allow technological innovation to have a transformational impact, and produce forces that can flexibly respond to contemporary challenges.⁷⁰ “However, a necessary step in achieving rapid decisive joint operations is to eliminate the large, attrition-based, logistically burdened combat formations of linear warfare, along with the requirement to establish and secure land-based lines of communication.”⁷¹ Regardless of the philosophy, any structural change will involve a change in mindset; and that is a tremendous task for any institution. This section examines how resources and organizational reform may influence consolidation.

The world of contingency contracting is—by some necessity and without regard to specific service agencies—one of regulations, legal restrictions, and paperwork. Bureaucratic structure and process are ubiquitous in civil augmentation programs. One contracting officer handbook, crafted by experts throughout DoD, indicates just how routine joint contracting operations are by listing the features of base contracts—regardless of service, agency, or contractor. There are several common factors: accounting for personnel and equipment, risk management, force protection, operator certification, duty/extended hours, clothing issue and

⁶⁹ Douglas A. Macgregor, *Transformation Under Fire: Revolutionizing How America Fights* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2003), 96.

⁷⁰ Ibid., 249.

⁷¹ Ibid.

wear, central processing, legal assistance, standard identification cards.⁷² The handbook provides sample formats for contractor deployment checklists and data. While mundane in respects, service CAP programs can—and have been expected to—function along standardized guidelines in joint environments.

Resources/Budgets

Budgets, perhaps more than any other entity, display the ferocity of inter-service rivalries over limited resources. General Schwarzkopf recalls the first day of operations in Grenada in which the Navy was reluctant to refuel Army helicopters because the Navy's comptroller had not yet worked out "the funds-transfer arrangements with the Army."⁷³ While the aircraft eventually refueled, this scenario starkly illustrates how parochial budget concerns can affect operations. Admiral Crowe observes that besides human resources, budget issues—especially during economic recessions—cause service leaders to defend their own turf, often in spite of the DoD's common good.⁷⁴

Since Goldwater-Nichols, however, combatant commanders have expanded their scopes, particularly in using service assets. Regional commanders now have greater budgetary, diplomatic, and economic clout than during the Cold War. Journalist Dana Priest describes this expanded role:

"The CINCs control headquarters budgets outside of Washington that total \$380 million a year, more than twice what they had when the Cold War ended. They travel nonstop, oversee multimillion-dollar foreign study institutes and round-

⁷² Amy Burrison, et al., "Contractor Support in the Theater of Operations: Deskbook Supplement" (Washington, DC: 28 March 2001), Paragraph 5.

⁷³ General H. Norman Schwarzkopf, *It Doesn't Take a Hero* (New York: Linda Grey: Bantam Books, 1992), 250.

⁷⁴ Crowe, 160.

the-clock intelligence centers, host international conferences and direct disaster relief.”⁷⁵

Stronger combatant commands may serve as models for the consolidation of military capabilities.

Resource consolidation appears to be one approach to retain a military that innovatively accomplishes missions while developing it to more effectively employ assets against national threats. Some DoD observers have suggested further empowering the CJCS and staff to perform training and doctrine functions. By providing more “dedicated personnel and funding for the critical task of writing and evaluating” joint doctrine, joint force training and employment will improve.⁷⁶ Concurrently, joint doctrine highlights the importance of the “control and timely use of various funding sources” for joint operations.⁷⁷ DoD consolidation could streamline the budget allocation process, making civil augmentation more responsive to US forces. Additionally, CAP is designed to have a single contractor support deployed forces. That single contractor is responsible for “providing support that effectively integrates construction, facility maintenance, and logistic support to the joint force.”⁷⁸ Contractors with streamlined access to various assets throughout the defense inventory will become very effective combat enablers. They are an example of how resources remain the key to consolidation and enhanced flexible response.

⁷⁵ Dana Priest, “A Four-Star Foreign Policy?” in *The Washington Post* (2000, 28 September), A01. Accessed on Proquest. “CINC” stands for commander-in-chief; “combatant commander” has replaced the term.

⁷⁶ Robert B. Adolph, Jr., et al, “Why Goldwater-Nichols Didn’t Go Far Enough,” in *Joint Force Quarterly* (Washington, DC: National Defense University, Spring 1995, No. 7), 50.

⁷⁷ Joint Staff, *Joint Publication 4-04: Joint Doctrine for Civil Engineering Support* (Washington, DC: Joint Staff, 27 September 2001, on-line at http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new_pubs/jp4_04.pdf), V-7.

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, V-8.

Organizational Reform

Senior military leadership is acutely aware of upcoming trends in the global threats that will confront US military organizations. They realize that change in organization must occur now. The 2004 *National Military Strategy* describes the capabilities the US military must possess to confront the threat environment. A capabilities-based force must handle multiple and concurrent operations, limited reconstitution periods, and rapid deployment timelines. It concludes that military capabilities, not service roles, must consolidate to meet the future threat: “To succeed, the Armed Forces must integrate Service capabilities in new and innovative [ways], reduce seams between combatant commands and develop more collaborative relationships with partners at home and abroad.”⁷⁹ Individual services, given the current asymmetric environment, have heeded the intent for joint consolidation.

The Army, for example, recently has issued a draft paper concerning the need to become a “campaign quality Army with a joint and expeditionary mindset.”⁸⁰ At issue is not only the unpredictable nature of the present threat but also the challenge of joining capabilities to optimize the strengths of the Army and all services/agencies. The paper declares that services have to do more than just work together. They must plan, support, and execute national policy in a unified effort: “...joint interdependence combines service capabilities to maximize their complementary rather than merely reinforcing effects, concurrently using each to offset the vulnerabilities of the others.”⁸¹ Training and education are key to reforming the existing service structure and anti-reform mindsets.

⁷⁹ Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, *National Military Strategy of the United States of America, 2004* (draft) (Washington, DC: JCS, May 2004), 23. Pages 12 & 14 address operational attributes.

⁸⁰ Department of the Army, *Serving a Nation at War: A Campaign Quality Army with a Joint and Expeditionary Mindset* (Draft Army White Paper) (Washington, D.C.: Office of CSA, 24 February 2004), title.

⁸¹ Department of the Army white paper, 4.

Professional education and training provide DoD the means by which to inculcate values, strategic vision, and scope in future leaders. This need has become paramount in an era in which the battle space is more unpredictable and fluid than ever. The Army white paper mentions the need to teach soldiers how to think creatively, not just what to think, and to use joint capabilities to solve problems—not just their own service’s.⁸² Marine helicopters refusing to fly Army soldiers, *ala* Grenada, is no longer acceptable.⁸³ Services have initiated positive reforms, but their impact remains unseen. The Joint Theater Air and Missile Defense Course, for example, was scheduled to begin at Fort Bliss in June 2004. The services are collaborating to create joint procedures for airspace control, identification, engagement authority, voice/data communication, and grid reference systems.⁸⁴ However, there are limitations to service initiatives. The white paper, for instance, stops short of recommending a unified professional education system for all DoD agencies which would promote the consolidation of capabilities. A look at the Canadian experience in military unification—more extreme than consolidation—can also provide valuable insight.

The Canadian unification experiment was intended, among other reasons, to streamline budgets and improve the military and economic efficiency of the armed forces. There was a negative impact upon personnel morale as the unit cohesion of combat units disintegrated under organizational shifts. Mr. Shaw has observed that the intent to cut costs was never met because anti-military Liberal politicians reduced the annual percentage allotted to the military budget, resulting in the military unable to purchase the updated equipment that “cost-cutting” was

⁸² Department of the Army white paper, 13 and 14.

⁸³ Schwarzkopf, 254.

⁸⁴ Department of the Army white paper, 20. The joint course will attempt to educate officers on these collaborative functions.

supposed to permit.”⁸⁵ Other observers have noted that the Canadian Forces have not yet attained unification due to stagnating service parochialism, rivalry, and civilianized management. One recommendation is for the military—in response to reduced budgets, experience, and equipment—to emulate Goldwater-Nichols reforms by becoming more joint in terms of operations and organization.⁸⁶ Perhaps the Canadians have not gone far enough with unification and de facto jointness is their next step. Bailey suggests that a consolidation of “infrastructure and personnel” would pay great dividends in terms of cost-effectiveness, interoperability, service cooperation, and available capabilities.⁸⁷ The Canadian experience does not necessarily denigrate consolidation or its potential to enhance joint capabilities; rather, it highlights the importance of the commitment of national leaders to focus on military reform to improve capabilities and effectiveness without detracting from service pride or fostering political aggrandizement.

Senior leaders understand the importance and consequences of reforming forces that have served the country well during the Cold War. The continuing debate on how to accomplish such positive reform lends significance to the effort. Political and military experts have considered the long-term implications of reorganization. Defense analysts have even pushed for restructuring service staffs along “functional rather than operational lines.” The goal is to make the military more effective while meeting Goldwater-Nichols’ intent of services fulfilling *Title X* responsibilities of “manning, equipping, training, and sustaining.”⁸⁸ The true challenges in reforming structure and culture lie in changing mindsets and the willingness to place the need for an effective force over the desires of individual services.

⁸⁵ Geoffrey D.T. Shaw, “The Canadian Armed Forces and Unification,” in *Defense Analysis* (Vol. 17, No. 2, 2001), 160, 171.

⁸⁶ K.W. Bailey, *Integration and Unification Equals Jointness in 21st Century Canadian Forces* (Toronto: Canadian Forces College, 6 May 2002), 5, 88.

⁸⁷ Bailey, 89-90.

⁸⁸ Stuart, 241. This note applies to the previous sentence as well.

Operations

There are costs and benefits to reform. National leadership has determined the need for the US military to adapt to contemporary battle space by tapping joint capabilities more effectively. While the inherent organizational reforms may result in more streamlined budgets, joint command structures, and available capabilities; current literature does not focus on potential vulnerabilities. One vulnerability may become the susceptibility of consolidated support systems—e.g., logistics—to compromise and attack. Unified systems, while more efficient, may also present greater signatures (i.e., targets) in battle space. Another vulnerability may be the erosion of individual service capabilities that were previously honed by the pride of competition. Military forces have traditionally performed specific missions very well; however, past performance does not have to curtail innovation toward potentially better performance. National decision makers will need to balance the advantages and disadvantages of military reform when designing military forces for the modern environment.

Capability Gaps

As suggested by the previous spear analogy, there are gaps in what capabilities the uniformed services can provide national policy makers. These gaps exist largely in the “shaft” of combat support and services; the “tip” requires little more than sharpening. As a result, the boundary of potential capability reforms among services should be drawn between support and combat forces in the DoD—where the head meets the shaft.

The capability gaps seem most apparent during complex operations. In operations involving air-ground cooperation, for example, each service’s unique perspective complicates joint collaboration. A service will provide its own weapon, ordnance, command-control structure, communications gear, doctrine, and culture to a given operation. The result can be

Marines who cannot talk to F-16s over critical target areas or special operations AC-130 gunships that cannot contact Navy or Marine aircraft in the same area.⁸⁹ There are also planning gaps.

A review of doctrine elicits these gaps. *Joint Publication 5-0: Doctrine for Joint Operations Planning*, for example, describes the individual planning processes used by each service. The Army Mobilization and Operations Planning and Execution System (AMOPES) not only integrates service capabilities with combatant commanders' requirements, but it also links the US Army Crisis Action System to joint crisis action planning.⁹⁰ The other services have their own planning systems which inevitably plug into the Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS) and organize mobilizations for contingency operations: the Navy Capabilities and Mobilization Plan (NCMP), the Marine Corps Capabilities Plan and Mobilization Management Plan (MCP and MPLAN), the Air Force War and Mobilization Plan (WMP), and the Coast Guard Capabilities Manual and Logistic Support and Mobilization Plan (CGCAPMAN and CGLSMP).⁹¹ The publication further defines the purpose of such collaborative efforts among services as unified action.⁹²

Services, despite tremendous strides toward jointness in recent years, are accustomed to independent planning. Meilinger notes that component staffs (e.g., CFACC or CFLCC) normally plan together but separately; the services, upon combatant commander approval, conduct the operations.⁹³ Meilinger aptly concludes that US forces are in dire need of increased joint

⁸⁹ Phillip S. Meilinger, "Air-Ground Cooperation Perspectives," in *Military Review* (Ft. Leavenworth, KS: USACGSC, November-December 2003), 55. This photocopied document was issued during the W324 Class at CGSC, AY 2004.

⁹⁰ Joint Staff, *Joint Publication 5-0: Doctrine for Joint Operations Planning*, 2nd Draft (Washington, DC: Joint Staff, 10 December 2002), II-12.

⁹¹ *Ibid.*, II-12-13.

⁹² *Ibid.*, II-13.

⁹³ Meilinger, "Air-Ground Cooperation Perspectives," 56.

training, doctrine—and, perhaps, “new joint tactical units.”⁹⁴ Here, again, is a call for consolidating force capabilities across service boundaries.

There are various differences among the service contracting programs. The Army and Air Force, for example, negotiate cost-plus award fee contracts⁹⁵ through service headquarters or regional commands. The Navy’s CONCAP, in contrast, uses a cost reimbursable contract administered through the Atlantic and Pacific Divisions.⁹⁶ Nonetheless, these differences are not insurmountable, for the services can—and do—utilize each other’s contract support.

There is little debate that all services have a greater need for access to joint-capability logistics support. The issue is if services will willingly cede control of their established systems (computer networks, command-control, organizations, procurement, levels of maintenance, et cetera) to a joint framework. The Army has indicated a willingness to “make resources available to a global logistics command.”⁹⁷ The service has even planned the reorganization of support commands to become more joint-capable:

“At the tactical level, to bridge the gap from theater or regional support commands to brigade combat teams, we already plan to convert current COSCOMS [corps support commands] and DISCOMS [division support commands] into joint-capable Army Expeditionary Support Commands that are more rapidly deployable, employable, modular and sustainable.”⁹⁸

The white paper stops short of promoting a joint logistics command structure.

Joint operational doctrine suggests the value of forming a unified contracting effort in joint operational areas. “A central contracting effort is necessary to ensure that scarce resources do not compete against escalating demands and that the main effort receives priority of

⁹⁴ Ibid., 58.

⁹⁵ Joint Staff, *Joint Publication 4-04: Joint Doctrine for Civil Engineering Support* (Washington, DC: Joint Staff, 27 September 2001, on-line at http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new_pubs/jp4_04.pdf), V-8, 9.

⁹⁶ Ibid., V-8.

⁹⁷ Department of the Army white paper, 20.

⁹⁸ Department of the Army white paper, 20.

support.”⁹⁹ The doctrine also reminds commanders in multi-national theaters to leverage linguists, especially in contracting.¹⁰⁰ Indeed, cultural and strategic awareness have become so interwoven in the fabric of contemporary military operations—such as in Iraq—that centralized contracting programs may expedite higher-level decision making in support of policy goals and facilitate greater access to DoD assets. In this manner, streamlined CAP decision making would lead to enhanced *efficiency*. This efficiency would translate into more uniformed personnel available for operational missions, thereby facilitating greater military *effectiveness*. An article on infrastructure repair in “post-conflict” Iraq addresses the fact that “civil affairs programs have been a common ingredient of foreign operations....They are now a near obsession as Iraq prepares for elections in January [2005] that, the Americans hope, will seat a popular government.”¹⁰¹ Such programs have greater strategic importance and, in the case of Iraq, provide force protection for coalition forces who are trying to win hearts and minds. A contracting authority established at the DoD level could bypass the initial pains of unifying the effort during joint and multi-national operations.

An observer may wonder if services would willingly support a joint logistics system that covers all facets: from installation exchanges to weapons, munitions, vehicles, fuel, and communications. The consolidation of support structures has historically threatened the independence of the services and has been often shunned.¹⁰² However, there is growing momentum at all levels, both inside and outside the Pentagon, to adapt. The recent CSIS report on Goldwater-Nichols, for instance, suggests consolidating senior staff functions for personnel,

⁹⁹ Joint Staff, *Joint Publication 3-0: Doctrine for Joint Operations* (Washington, DC: Joint Staff, 10 September 2001), VI-12.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid.

¹⁰¹ “Even Militia Backs Sewer Repair,” in *The Kansas City Star* (*The New York Times*: 5 September 2004), A17.

¹⁰² For example, the USMC experienced a lack of adequate air support from the Army Air Corps at Guadalcanal; henceforth, this would reinforce their demands for organic air support.

logistics, and communications to better support joint capabilities.¹⁰³ Leaders will need to remain open-minded enough to consider consolidation as a means to make the military a more flexible, responsive, and thus more effective force.

In summary, the capability gaps among the services are predominantly located in the support of combat operations. Crossing these gaps will take time and resources in the face of legal, cultural, and organizational constraints. However, incremental reform in that direction could begin with civil augmentation programs—an arena in which joint operations have consistently occurred.¹⁰⁴

CHAPTER THREE

CROSSING CAPABILITY GAPS

It is a primary interest of the United States to close capability gaps within its armed services. The gaps previously identified in joint operations, planning, and logistics have often recurred during operations throughout American history. As a result, they demand a systemic and reasonable approach to problem solving. While such efforts are possible through legal routes, institutional reform remains formidable. The Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 exemplified the opportunity and intricacy of reform. The legislation incorporated fundamental structural change in defense organization that directly impacted operations. While structural reform may not require legislation, past records indicate an institutional resistance to reform—regardless of the means.

¹⁰³ Eric Schmitt, “Study Urges Reorganization To Streamline The Pentagon,” in *New York Times* (New York, March 18, 2004, on-line attachment), 2.

¹⁰⁴ Other gaps may also exist in legal, acquisition, and interoperability areas of concern; however, they are beyond the scope of this paper.

Goldwater-Nichols Helped Set the Stage

In 1986, landmark legislation instituted bold and long-overdue reforms in the DoD. The Defense Reorganization Act changed departmental structure almost to a revolutionary degree: more power to combatant commanders, less to service chiefs, and oversight to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS). The legislation was constructive because it streamlined the command structure between civilian decision makers and combatant commanders. Commanders could more efficiently employ assets from all services in specific theaters. The streamlined structure allowed for greater flexibility.

Flexibility was what the modern US military—forged during World War II, Korea, and Vietnam—needed. Recent US operations (Haiti, Somalia, Bosnia, Grenada, Panama, Afghanistan) reveal that the contemporary threat is not necessarily conventional or unilateral. Non-nation-state actors such as Al Qaeda have entered the global scene. There are conventional and asymmetric threats, and the US military must remain capable of responding to both.

Current US military organizations and cultures are designed to address an obsolete national threat: the Soviet Union. Therefore, they do not innately consider new forms of asymmetrical threats and unconventional foes.¹⁰⁵ Many weapon systems developed for the Cold War are being phased out or reduced in stockage. A critical force-management question then surfaces: how can the US military retain its “big war”¹⁰⁶ capabilities while honing its unconventional sword?

The answer lies in the renovation of US military command architecture that will foster incremental adaptation to dynamic contemporary threats. Considering the change-resistant atmosphere of military institutions, this is a dramatic—albeit crucial—undertaking. Legislators

¹⁰⁵ Gabel, Class discussion (9 December 2003).

¹⁰⁶ Ibid., Written review.

Goldwater and Nichols showed that institutional reform can update the military's capability to perform its national security role.

Services Already Function Together

Contingency contracts provide a medium for agencies to cope with a demanding and dynamic environment. Civil augmentation programs, in particular, were designed to provide additional flexibility to armed forces that were already stretched in personnel, materiel, and budgets. As a consequence, the service departments have recognized the value of collaboration. CAP consolidation may serve as a next logical step in providing the services even more resources they can readily and reliably tap.

A common denominator among defense civil augmentation programs is the uncertain nature of contingency projects. These scenarios present several common factors: accounting for personnel and equipment, risk management, force protection, operator certification, duty/extended hours, clothing issue and wear, central processing, legal assistance, standard identification cards. The armed services recognize the importance of working together, especially in contingency contract operations. Several manuals note that it is not only normal but also necessary to work with other DoD agencies to accomplish the mission in the contemporary battle space. *Air Force Instruction 10-204: Readiness Exercises and After-Action Reporting Program*, for example, is doctrine for coordinating and conducting exercises and after-action reviews. The manual provides guidance concerning the employment of contractors to support exercises: have clear statements of work and measures of performance.¹⁰⁷ Another Air Force publication, *Contingency Contracting*, points out that there are formats that serve common contracting

¹⁰⁷ Department of the Air Force, *Air Force Instruction 10-204: Readiness Exercises and After-Action Reporting Program*, 8. Additionally, the instructions discuss using contract augmentation programs such as AFCAP and the Army's LOGCAP prior to resorting to the War Reserve Materiel (WRM) for exercises (9).

functions for all services. On the first page of its chapter on “Contingency Contracting Procedures,” for example, the manual states that purchase request documents can be submitted on either Air Force or DoD (DD) forms: DD Form 1348-1, DD Form 1348-6, DD Form 448, or AF Form 9.¹⁰⁸ A perusal of service handbooks indicates that there are several “standard forms.” This observation indicates that common contractor functions can be formatted to accommodate the specific requirements of services and projects. Individual services recognize the value of theater external support programs that are available through sister services.

Varying missions may make it difficult for contracting officers to employ standard guidelines. Contracting officers, for instance, cannot precisely write the nature or scope of work for changing conditions.¹⁰⁹ The Army Corps of Engineers—as the Army’s initial contracting authority, for example—designated the cost-plus-award-fee contract as the standard. This contract type would maximize flexibility in most full-spectrum operational environments. The contract has “a base and award fee structure that determines the amount of profit the contractor should receive.”¹¹⁰ The AFCAP and CONCAP programs have adopted the cost-reimbursement contract as their standard due to its flexibility.¹¹¹

In addition to common contract structures, there are several common characteristics of the service civil augmentation programs. First, they aim to provide quick-response contract service support early during deployments. Second, they free “military manpower for use in combat and other critical tasks.”¹¹² Next, the service programs are cost-effective in that they cost

¹⁰⁸ Jose R. Medina, et al, *Contingency Contracting: Project Number LC9707101* (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air Force Logistics Management Agency, July 1997, on-line: <http://aflsa.maxwell.af.smil.mil...>, 206 pages), 101. The Navy also uses DD Form 448, Military Interdepartmental Purchase Request (MIPR) (*The Naval Contingency Contracting Handbook*, Appendix F).

¹⁰⁹ Nicholas J. Kolar, Jr., “LOGCAP: Providing Vital Services to Soldiers,” in *Engineer Professional Bulletin* (March 1997) 2. Issued through CGSC during SAMS. LTC Kolar provides a good overview of the LOGCAP program—its history, employment, and facilitation of strategic projection.

¹¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹¹ Ibid. See also Higgins, 3.

¹¹² Ibid., 5.

“less than if the military had performed the tasks without...CAP assistance....”¹¹³ Fourth, the CAPs use civilian logistical resources that do not conflict with strategic lift capabilities. Finally, civil augmentation, “Improves peacetime planning for contingency operations.”¹¹⁴ The common functions in defense civil augmentation programs have afforded the services greater access to more contracting support.

CAP contractors have participated in many operations in several theaters and have supported various agencies. For example, pre-arranged AFCAP contracts have served to fill in shortfalls in “feeding, laundry, lodging,” and cleaning “during the time span between loss of Army support and contract award.”¹¹⁵ At Camp Pendleton, AFCAP contractors planned with a joint task force to coordinate mass evacuation and cleanup operations in response to the potential use of weapons of mass destruction.¹¹⁶ AFCAP has additionally served the needs of other governmental agencies such as the Department of Justice (detention facility construction and homestead planning) and the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (housing support, emergency response, and materiel distribution).¹¹⁷ CAP programs, as demonstrated by AFCAP, have regularly functioned with other services and government agencies. Their continued, efficient collaboration will enhance future US strategic operations.

The aforementioned East Timor mission demonstrated the inherent flexibility of LOGCAP in support and stability operations. US Pacific Command (PACOM) identified an additional need for contractors to support US personnel assigned to support the transfer of authority to UN forces. DynCorp, the contractor, calculated the additional costs, hired many

¹¹³ Ibid.

¹¹⁴ Ibid.

¹¹⁵ “AFCAP Capability Overview” (Readiness Management Support, 23 August 2004, on-line: [http://www.rms-lc.com/capabilities/capabilities01 \[& .03\].html](http://www.rms-lc.com/capabilities/capabilities01 [& .03].html)), 3.

¹¹⁶ Ibid., 2.

¹¹⁷ Ibid., 2-3.

host-nation citizens which boosted the local economy, and provided the support.¹¹⁸ The East Timor mission demonstrated the flexibility of civil augmentation programs and how DoD, sister services, and international organizations can collaborate to meet the mission without unnecessarily depleting military assets. “The efforts by the contractors there [East Timor] have validated the fundamental LOGCAP concept that the United States can support its overseas commitments without always having to use military assets directly.”¹¹⁹ Additionally, civil augmentation enhances strategic planning capabilities by providing a structure for the close cooperation of contractors and combatant commanders. For example, “the LOGCAP Program Manager’s Office has 28 plans on the shelf that address the needs of every unified commander in chief in practically every part of the world.”¹²⁰ The former US General Accounting Office (GAO) has scrutinized this diverse potential of civil augmentation programs.

The GAO’s 1997 report on contingency operations reviews the history of LOGCAP, how it is currently employed, and offers recommendations for its improvement. The report notes up front the program’s initial concept: “LOGCAP was established by the Army in 1985 as a means to (1) preplan for the use of contractor support in contingencies or crises and (2) take advantage of existing civilian resources in the United States and overseas to augment active and reserve forces.”¹²¹ Like other CAPs, it is available to other services and agencies.¹²² The report provides a helpful definition of “cost-plus-award-fee” contract, which is employed by service CAPs:

“...allows the contractor to be reimbursed for all reasonable, allowable, and allocable costs incurred. Under the original contract, the contractor earns a base fee of 1 percent of the estimated contract cost. The contractor also earns an

¹¹⁸ James Folk and Andy Smith, “A LOGCAP Success in East Timor,” in *Army Logistian* (Fort Lee: JUL/AUG 2000, Vol. 32, Iss. 4, pp. 38-42, on-line via ProQuest, 6 pages), 4-5.

¹¹⁹ Ibid., 5.

¹²⁰ Ibid., 6.

¹²¹ United States General Accounting Office, “Contingency Operations: Opportunities to Improve the Logistics Civil Augmentation Program” (Washington, DC: GAO/NSIAD-97-63, February 1997, on-line: <http://www.amc.Army.mil/LOGCAP/Resources1.html>), 2.

¹²² Ibid.

incentive fee of up to 9 percent of the cost estimate based on the contractor's performance....”¹²³

During the peacekeeping mission in Bosnia, LOGCAP provided deployed military personnel vital services such as bus transportation, housing, food service, equipment maintenance, and laundry operations.¹²⁴ The Army used contractor support as a last resort but was forced to do so due to several limitations: troop ceilings, lack of host-nation support, and the requirement to have forces available for major regional conflicts.¹²⁵ The report concludes that joint doctrine on “how to manage contractor resources and effectively integrate them with force structure” is inadequate.¹²⁶

Additionally, the Navy and Air Force have used LOGCAP for several missions. The Navy and Air Force used LOGCAP services during support missions at Somalia and Aviano, Italy.¹²⁷ They justify their civil augmentation programs, formed after LOGCAP, because they “believe contractor responsiveness and control can be enhanced by separate programs.”¹²⁸ The GAO report authors question this logic, observing that, “Many of the services provided under all three programs are similar, and it may be more efficient and effective to have one service act as the single manager.”¹²⁹

The GAO has noted the potential for duplication in civil augmentation function and costs, resulting in a diluted unity of effort: “Although the size and primary purpose of the three programs differ somewhat, the contracts will require similar engineering, logistics, and planning

¹²³ Ibid.

¹²⁴ Ibid., 3.

¹²⁵ Ibid., 4.

¹²⁶ Ibid.

¹²⁷ Ibid., 24. The Air Force notes that its program is different from LOGCAP in that it uses contractors to sustain infrastructure and services after uniformed personnel have reacted to contingencies. AFCAP, however, still requires that contractors be prepared to deploy and construct infrastructure when needed.

¹²⁸ Ibid., 5.

¹²⁹ Ibid., 5.

services.”¹³⁰ Additionally, there may be more credible and cogent authority—and hence, “responsiveness”—to a consolidated, DoD program office than to three lower-level offices with different protocols. The GAO acknowledges that the DoD, on occasions to improve efficiency, has designated a service as a lead for joint contract operations. For example, the Army manages wholesale storage of ammunition and chemical weapon stockpile for the DoD.¹³¹ The “Contingency Operations” report recommends clearer doctrine regarding the employment of contract resources, improved mechanisms to manage cost and contract performance, and consideration of consolidation of CAP resources with individual services as lead agencies. The recommendations stop short of suggesting DoD-level consolidation of CAP.

Civilian contingency contracting is intended for long-term support, as required, after the initial military response to a crisis situation.¹³² Contracts provide support to each service and to several federal agencies. Common access to contract support is crucial for the successful sustainment of long-term operations and strategic policies. For example, while AFCAP supports the Air Force, “...the program is open to the other services, as well as Federal and State government agencies.”¹³³ It would behoove service contractors, then—in order to reduce conflict with national agencies such as State and the FBI—to encourage the consolidation of CAP at the DoD.

Room for Further Improvement

The contemporary and future security environments demand a military that can flexibly respond to any challenge. Redundant functions among civil contract augmentation programs help the military achieve a broader spectrum of objectives than they could with internal assets.

¹³⁰ Ibid., 23.

¹³¹ Ibid., 24-5.

¹³² “AFCAP Capability Overview” (Readiness Management Support, 23 August 2004, on-line: [http://www.rms-lc.com/capabilities/capabilities01 \[& .03\].html](http://www.rms-lc.com/capabilities/capabilities01 [& .03].html)), 1.

¹³³ Ibid.

Consolidating those redundant functions would further pool private assets that could serve common service missions. While resource, cultural, and structural barriers may impede the effort, the modern arena virtually demands consolidation to synergistically meet multifarious threats.

Understanding the demands of the security environment is an important first step to determine required capabilities. The *Joint Vision 2020* outlines a strategic vision for the national security environment for up to thirty years hence. The document describes attributes of this dynamic environment and describes key concepts such as interoperability and focused logistics that are necessary for optimal military capability. *Interoperability* highlights the value of synergy of the unified effort of individual services: “The ability of systems, units, or forces to provide services to and accept services from other systems, units, or forces and to use the services so exchanged to enable them to operate effectively together.”¹³⁴ *Focused logistics* emphasizes enhancing joint sustainment capabilities by increasing visibility of and access to service logistics systems. It “is the ability to provide the joint force the right personnel, equipment, and supplies in the right place, at the right time, and in the right quantity, across the full range of military operations.”¹³⁵ Focused logistics and other operational concepts such as dominant maneuver, precision engagement, and full-dimensional protection will enable the military to achieve full-spectrum dominance.¹³⁶ The vision briefly alludes to an end state in which the military has enhanced performance due to a more efficient logistics system: “The result for the joint force of the future will be an improved link between operations and logistics resulting in precise time-

¹³⁴ Joint Chiefs of Staff, Chairman, *Joint Vision 2020* (Washington, DC: USGPO, June 2000), 10. The definition cited comes from *Joint Publication 1-02*.

¹³⁵ *Ibid.*, 30.

¹³⁶ See also Meinhart, 27. He notes that the *Joint Vision 2020* also includes information superiority and interagency collaboration as key environmental factors.

definite delivery of assets to the warfighter.”¹³⁷ The ultimate measure of improved CAP performance will be contract support that is more reliable, consistent, and cost-effective for the US military.

Modern joint task force (JTF) commands and joint doctrine have proceeded toward improved CAP support. *Joint Publication 5-00.2: Joint Task Force Planning, Guidance, and Procedures* specifies the general requirements of contract support in joint operations areas (JOAs). The JTF in a theater may publish a contracting support plan that coordinates and outlines the “procedures and policies” for agencies using LOGCAP, AFCAP, CONCAP, and other contracting assets.¹³⁸ In order to facilitate procedural coordination and minimize inter-service friction, JTF headquarters may establish contracting offices. The publication, perhaps, would not have to mention the several steps required to coordinate joint contracting operations if there was adequate joint contracting doctrine. The JTF contracting office will,

“Provide coordination and cooperation among Services that maintain parallel contracting organizations within the JOA. Preclude inter-Service competition for local supplies or services, and obtain the most advantageous prices through consolidation of requirements to more effectively utilize scarce personnel resources.”¹³⁹

If several services routinely expect to use parallel assets in the same theater to support a single commander with common objectives, what would preclude the consolidation of contracting organizations and their assets?

Consolidation may prove to become a necessity rather than an optimal solution to resource scarcity. As deployments become more frequent and long-term, their costs in terms of personnel and materiel rise. Anderson and Flaherty’s research of recent contract operations indicates that the cost of military deployments has risen while the number of uniformed personnel

¹³⁷ *Joint Vision 2020*, 31.

¹³⁸ Joint Staff, *Joint Publication 5-00.2: Joint Task Force Planning, Guidance, and Procedures* (Washington, DC: Joint Staff, 13 January 1999), VIII, 11.

¹³⁹ *Ibid.*

has declined. They suggest that mission duration, personnel deployed, and cost are the largest factors contributing to overall contract costs.¹⁴⁰ The ratio of “dollars to personnel supported has increased over time” to an estimated \$315.00 per day, per person in OEF/OIF.¹⁴¹ The authors imply, “...this is due to the increased contract cost for supplies and services provided to service-members while deployed as a result of outsourcing.”¹⁴² Anderson and Flaherty suggest the criticality of having contract officers work with joint task forces as early as possible in the planning process. Since contractors are a permanent part of battle space, they must become more integrated in joint planning. Integration at the joint and coalition levels will continue to be critical to success in battle space.

CHAPTER FOUR

ANALYSIS OF CHANGE

The methodology for this monograph uses a pattern-matching approach to answer the research question. The evaluation factors to analyze the data include flexibility, cost-effectiveness, mission support, and interoperability (i.e., greater access to other DoD resources). Synergy, a descriptor of the enhanced effectiveness of an organization when it is consolidated rather than operating as an independent agency, is also a necessary component of any successful civil augmentation program. These criteria, espoused in concept by *Joint Vision 2020*, help anticipate the value of the proposed revisions in the US military and facilitate comparison with the Canadian model. The pattern-matching mode of analysis¹⁴³ helps develop evaluation criteria which describe the predicted outcomes of a DoD-consolidated civil augmentation program.

¹⁴⁰ Michael S. Anderson and Gregory P. Flaherty, *Analysis of the Contingency Contracting Support Plan within the Joint Planning Process Framework* (Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, MBA Professional Report, December 2003), 29.

¹⁴¹ Ibid., 30.

¹⁴² Ibid.

¹⁴³ Robert K. Yin, *Case Study Research: Design and Methods* (Newbury Park: Sage Publications, 1989), 109.

LOGCAP, AFCAP, and CONCAP are the services' primary—not sole—civil augmentation programs. They define the scope (i.e., dependent variables) for this study.

The purpose of such consolidation would be to retain organizational flexibility and the capability to confront contemporary challenges. The primary CAPs and core assumptions narrow the focus on key issues. Service cultures may be different, but is it optimal to have separate services provide disparate solutions to the same issues? Organizational reform may generate operational risks. In turn, institutional reform—necessitated by national interests—must supersede the reluctance to change.

Characteristics & Factors

The evaluation criteria in this context consist of factors which describe the essential attributes for a successful civil augmentation program. *Flexibility* refers to “flexible response” (previously defined) in which a civil augmentation program would directly enable an organization to respond to more than one contingency concurrently. *Cost-effectiveness* relates to the amount of dollars saved and numbers of uniformed personnel retained for operations by using civilian contractors instead of deployable assets. In other words, it describes the amount of task-specific military assets that are not deployed because civilian contractor personnel and equipment have performed the assigned tasks. *Mission support* refers to the number of different types of missions a program can support among the military services. Finally, *interoperability* addresses the ability of a contracting agency to gain access to the assets of another DoD agency to use them for their own purposes.

Patterns of Functionality

Several patterns emerge from observing the various functions of the service civil augmentation programs.

- ⇒ Other agencies outside the service or DoD can and have employed CAPs.

- ⇒ They each provide a critical service which uniformed personnel can provide.
- ⇒ Service CAPs have several redundant functions which focus on several areas of support: facility management, basic needs (food service, water, showers, laundries), building and infrastructure construction (power generation, sanitation), security, procurement, maintenance support, transportation, road construction, airport construction and management, and recreational services (physical training and religious facilities).

The first trend is that DoD contracting programs routinely support external agencies.

The civil augmentation programs are not solely for military contractors; other government agencies regularly contract for CAP services. For example, the US Agency for International Development (USAID) coordinated for the AFCAP contractor, Readiness Management Support L.C. (RMS), to support Iraqi reconstruction efforts—specifically, “warehousing, customs clearance, trucking and distribution of bottled water.”¹⁴⁴ The initial contract, arranged through interagency cooperation, was for \$4 million and is expected to expand. The Air Force program routinely “allows...federal and state agencies to call on private companies to provide logistics and engineering support for operations.”¹⁴⁵

The second pattern of functionality concerns the provision of service support that is necessary for mission accomplishment and compensates for the lack of military personnel and materiel. Each program uniquely solves the same problem: how to support the combatant commander with contingency contracting services in order to maximize uniformed personnel available for missions.¹⁴⁶ Higgins explains that DoD civil augmentation programs serve to support joint operations worldwide and “prevent the dilution of military forces that would occur if

¹⁴⁴ William B. Cassidy, “AFCAP Gets USAID Contract,” in *Traffic World* (Newark: 5 May 2003, p. 1, on-line via ProQuest), 1.

¹⁴⁵ Ibid.

¹⁴⁶ See Appendix A for a list of the specific functions of each service program.

the military had to provide the required services and support.”¹⁴⁷ They are normally cost-plus-award-fee contracts, planned during peace to support “a combatant [i.e., joint] commander in a contingency or war.”¹⁴⁸ Civilian augmentation programs are also expensive (especially for last-minute contract revisions) and are often constrained by host-nation personnel caps; however, they free up uniformed personnel for the fight.¹⁴⁹ More personnel available for missions exemplifies the fundamental cost-effectiveness of civil augmentation programs.

Mark Terry of the Defense Contract Management Agency observes that combatant commanders are employing more contract support in the contemporary battle space. He cites such factors as increasingly complex systems support, greater logistic requirements for deployed forces, command and control issues, and the demands of force protection as reasons for the surge. He discusses the benefits of contract support: “Programs like LOGCAP and AFCAP have been used effectively during contingency operations to provide supplies and services to the deployed military force.”¹⁵⁰ However, every force multiplier has a cost: “Using contractors in lieu of uniformed military personnel causes difficulties with both Command and Control as well as with providing Operational Force Protection.”¹⁵¹ Terry states this cost, “...is an additional level of complexity added to the commander’s contingency planning resulting from the presence of and reliance on large numbers of non-combatant contractor personnel in the theatre of operations.”¹⁵²

The US defense establishment has, in recent history, used civilian contractors to support military operations. Terry notes that in 2001, after several iterative force reductions, “civilians still made up approximately 33% of the total active duty DoD workforce”—no change from the

¹⁴⁷ Peter J. Higgins, “Civilian Augmentation of Joint Operations” (4 pages, on-line: <http://www.almc.Army.mil/alog/Issues/JanFeb03/MS870.htm>), 3.

¹⁴⁸ Ibid.

¹⁴⁹ Ibid.

¹⁵⁰ Mark D. Terry, *Contingency Contracting and Contracted Logistics Support: A Force Multiplier* (Newport, RI: Naval War College, December 2003), 1.

¹⁵¹ Ibid.

¹⁵² Ibid., 2.

twelve previous years.¹⁵³ He also observes a trend in operational commanders' increased reliance upon civilian contract support when "there is a limitation on the mobilization or the number of troops in theatre."¹⁵⁴ The services have hired more single contractors who, in turn, hired sub-contractors for specific capabilities—through CAPs.¹⁵⁵

More than other types of contingency contracts, external theater support contracts present managerial challenges because agencies outside of the theater command establish them. As a result, contractor work performance is evaluated strictly by the statement of work outlined in a contract. "If the environmental conditions within a theatre change during the execution of a mission, the lack of a CO [contracting officer] in theatre to speedily change contracts can significantly reduce the flexibility of the operational commander to successfully complete his assigned mission."¹⁵⁶ Thus, having an adaptive contracting officer in a joint operational area who can readily revise contracts to support dynamic support requirements is critical.

Terry cites several service-specific examples of the benefits of the civil augmentation programs. "According to a GAO study, a full 10% of the money that the DoD has spent in the Balkans has been paid to contractors for battlefield support."¹⁵⁷ AFCAP engineer support during Operation Enduring Freedom enabled the 820th Squadron to use leased equipment to "lay 30,000 tons of asphalt in 13 days."¹⁵⁸ This allowed the Air Force to complete a two-year project in just six months. This fact qualifies this program as cost-effective. The contractor also assisted Army operations by constructing three refugee camps in Kosovo within 45 days¹⁵⁹—thereby exhibiting

¹⁵³ Ibid., 3.

¹⁵⁴ Ibid., 4.

¹⁵⁵ Ibid., 9.

¹⁵⁶ Ibid., 13.

¹⁵⁷ Ibid., 11.

¹⁵⁸ Ibid.

¹⁵⁹ Ibid., 12.

flexibility and interoperability. Terry notes that Readiness Management Support (RMS) has earned over \$200 million since 1997 from supporting the Air Force.¹⁶⁰

Terry believes the trend toward increased privatization of core military jobs will continue. Current administration leaders have decided to use outsourcing to gain strategic leverage, cut costs, and enhance the military's lethality.¹⁶¹ For example, Secretary Rumsfeld proposed a plan to Congress that would keep "the uniformed strength of the military constant at 1.5 million" while converting as many as 300,000 jobs now performed by uniformed personnel to civilian contractor positions.¹⁶² Indeed, outsourcing key support tasks has relieved some of the pressure on a military that has persistent global obligations.

The complexity of the contracting and acquisition systems requires that civil augmentation not be conducted in isolation. The need for augmentation in the battle space has long been established. Naval supply instructions, for instance, indicate that contingency contracting is, especially in the ever-changing security environment, here to stay. At the same time, contracting cannot be effective in a vacuum: "The need for a viable contingency contracting capability arises from the complex nature of the acquisition process and the necessity to support joint or multinational forces."¹⁶³ Furthermore, service doctrine—not so much joint doctrine—stresses the importance of knowing the operational definitions of key terms. For example, the Navy defines a "contingency" as "any operation involving the activities of U.S. forces in OOTW and MRC."¹⁶⁴ Additionally, "'contingency contracting' is the process of contracting for available supplies and services in immediate local support of deployed units,

¹⁶⁰ Ibid., 11.

¹⁶¹ Ibid., 5-6.

¹⁶² Ibid., 6.

¹⁶³ Department of the Navy, "NAVSUP Instruction 4230.37A: Naval Contingency Contracting Program" (Washington, DC: Naval Supply Systems Command, Memorandum, 9 April 1996), 1.

¹⁶⁴ Ibid., 3.

posts, camps, or stations during a contingency operation.”¹⁶⁵ The requirement for a common lexicon indicates the inevitability of consolidated joint contracting operations.

The third observed pattern in the system of DoD civil augmentation programs concerns the fact that service programs share redundant functions in several common areas of support. In general, the common functions consist of environmental services, infrastructure development, construction, power generation & distribution, services (morale, welfare, and recreation), and facility management. These programs, exemplified previously, validate the evaluation criteria. The effectiveness of these programs, especially when employed jointly, has generated further interest in consolidation. Coombs states, for example, that not only are joint contracting efforts useful but they should further integrate during stability operations. He recommends, “Co-locate the Joint Contracting Cell with the Civil-Military Operations Center to leverage each cell’s capabilities with the other.”¹⁶⁶

There will always be critics. Several congressional leaders, such as Representative Waxman, have questioned the enormous profits made by contractors like Halliburton during Operation Iraqi Freedom. Spinner cites that the Army has paid Halliburton \$496.3 million “under a general logistics contract the firm won through a competitive bid in December 2001.”¹⁶⁷ The substantial size of these contracts brings into question the potential vulnerability of a consolidated civil augmentation program to defaulted contracts. However, potential risks can be mitigated through properly installed controls such as contracting officer representative (COR) oversight,

¹⁶⁵ Ibid., 3-4.

¹⁶⁶ John L. Coombs, *Contingency Contracting and Private Volunteer Organization Procurement in Uzbekistan: A Comparative Analysis* (Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, Thesis, June 2002), 94.

¹⁶⁷ Jackie Spinner, “Waxman Seeks Details on Halliburton; Lawmaker Questions Scope of Iraq-Related Contracts,” in *The Washington Post* (Washington, DC: 30 May 2003, final edition, p. E03, on-line via ProQuest, 2 pages), 1.

standardized contract formats, and the acquisition system being closely linked to the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) mandates.

What Would a Joint CAP Look Like?

A DoD-consolidated civil augmentation program, if designated, would function to provide more effective civilian contractor support to military forces in operational areas. Program designers would certainly need to address the risks involved in consolidation, revise and disseminate joint doctrine, meet the needs of DoD components, and standardize contract formats. More importantly, department leaders would implement important, long-lasting decisions in the areas of *training and doctrine, resource access, and joint oversight compliance*. By developing a shared vision that incorporates these three factors, DoD leaders could successfully consolidate civil augmentation while mitigating the inherent risks of institutional reform.

First, an emphasis on developing *doctrine and requisite training* to produce qualified personnel in all departments would help establish the framework for joint consolidation. Doctrine, the common language, would create a common start point by forming the link to DoD and national policy requirements.¹⁶⁸ Professional contracting officers and other department leaders, using their cumulative experience and judgment, would collaborate to template standardized contract formats and compliance criteria. Recognizing each case—each mission—is unique, joint doctrine would focus on setting parameters broad enough to permit innovation while concurrently holding each service and contractor to the same standards. Initial training and periodic education would indoctrinate contracting personnel to the new joint standards and the mindset of compliance. While facilitating the long-term assimilation of new doctrine, training would help ensure continuity of the institutional knowledge base.

¹⁶⁸ See Appendix B for a sample section of proposed joint CAP doctrine.

CAP consolidation would provide contracting officers *greater access to assets* throughout the Department of Defense. Contracting officers, being DoD rather than service agents, would be empowered to provide a greater range of civil augmentation services to more forces. This arrangement depicts cost-effectiveness for the DoD. By eliminating the separate service walls of bureaucracy, contracting officers would technically be able to tap into contracts that other services once had, to support deployed joint forces as executive agents without having to coordinate with individual components, and to use a common database and format for contracts. Consolidation would also create a reservoir of joint contracting officers who would be qualified and authorized to supervise existing projects, to initiate new contracts, and to ensure standard compliance by civilian contractors—regardless of service affiliation. If a contract were to default, enhanced inter-service collaboration and the access to more resources could mitigate most negative effects.

Joint oversight compliance would be a critical factor in consolidation because it would link contract support to validated policy and doctrine. In essence, consolidating the CAP at the joint level would bring it closer to the purview of the JROC and the strategic intent of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This rather minimal structural reform would translate into a more direct oversight of civilian-military contracting activities which, by nature, have significant strategic impact on national policy. The tighter linkage between political strategy and contracting objectives would then more effectively support the DoD, the services, and national policy. Furthermore, joint oversight would help solidify the implementation of US Governmental policy by unifying the efforts of various agencies to support military operations and acquisition. The unified effort and streamlined bureaucracy would help avoid potential lapses in contract support resulting from a tenuous linkage between strategic aims and military objectives. In an era of increasing strategic effects by civil-military operations, strengthened strategic-operational linkage is not only good but critical.

A few defense observers have explored the possibility of the joint consolidation of civil augmentation programs. One group proposes an appropriate label, “JCAP” (Joint Civil Augmentation Program), for a program that would merge AFCAP and LOGCAP. Their paper questions the validity of services managing separate civil augmentation programs that, for the most part, serve similar functions. Additionally, it refers to a GAO report that suggests the lack of clear joint contracting doctrine which describes “how to properly integrate contractor resources with the military force structure during contingency operations.”¹⁶⁹ The researchers conclude that consolidating the AFCAP and LOGCAP would enhance contracting support provided to combatant commanders:

A “JCAP contract [should] be established that will meet the needs of both services while eliminating their duplication of effort. A joint contract would provide unity of effort in meeting JTF commander logistic responsibilities with an end result of improved efficiency of operations. A JCAP is the next logical step in the evolution of civil augmentation programs....”¹⁷⁰

Continued dialogue among stakeholders in DoD is critical for the evolution of civilian contractor support of military operations. To reiterate, DoD leaders could successfully consolidate civil augmentation while mitigating the inherent risks of institutional reform by creating joint training and doctrine, streamlined bureaucracy, and explicit policy oversight.

Implications

The primary implications of a DoD-level civil augmentation program would be reduced bureaucratic barriers to inter-departmental contracting and thereby more flexibly responsive support to a service during any mission. The consolidation of common functions has been a normal trend in corporate headquarters. Specific implications of a JCAP may be categorized

¹⁶⁹ Maria J. Dowling and Vincent J. Feck, *Feasibility of a Joint Engineering and Logistics Contract* (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air Command and Staff College, April 1999), v.

¹⁷⁰ Ibid., 40.

further as advantages (measured in terms of the dependent variables) or disadvantages for mission support.

Advantages

- ⇒ Unified effort. A consolidated structure would facilitate unity during joint and multi-national operations.
- ⇒ Enhanced interoperability.
- ⇒ Overall lower costs for wholesale—versus by-service—contracting.
- ⇒ Standardized contract formats. Not only would standardization facilitate inter-service/agency collaboration, but it would also facilitate the integration of allies and coalition partners.
- ⇒ Greater synergy. Centralized management would avoid redundancy. Concurrently, centralization would shift decision making to higher levels within DoD, suggesting the need for larger staffs in either the Secretary of Defense or Joint Staff area.¹⁷¹ Centralization would also facilitate coordination among agencies across service boundaries.
- ⇒ Streamlined bureaucracy and flexible response would support the Secretary of Defense's *Title X* responsibilities to limit redundancy when permissible.
- ⇒ Increased joint oversight over contractor performance and compliance.

Disadvantages

- ⇒ Less diverse contractor load: consolidated functions may result in fewer contractors performing more contractor tasks. Overloaded contractors may potentially default on more contract tasks.
- ⇒ Fewer options for the government if a contractor defaults. With fewer contractors fulfilling multi-functional bids, the government would most likely be forced to rebid the contracts that remained open.
- ⇒ The growth of DoD staffs. Larger staffs are also a requirement for enhanced joint coordination. As staff sizes increase, the bureaucratic distance (i.e., decision and

¹⁷¹ Peter Wright, Charles D. Pringle, and Mark J. Kroll, *Strategic Management* (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1993), 83-4. This business management text provides a paradigm for the effects of centralization in organizations. Corporate examples of these effects include Coca-Cola and Chrysler. While government and business organization are not always parallel, there is a greater linkage, I believe, in the realm of contracting because of its inherent political-military nature.

communication gaps) between the Pentagon and service agencies tends to increase—potentially depleting responsiveness. The management of staff size versus functions will become critical but not insurmountable.

The functional consolidation of DoD civil augmentation programs would facilitate the systemic advantages while compensating for the stated disadvantages. The centralized management of multi-functional contracts would provide greater oversight, avoid unanticipated contract defaults, and expedite the process for any military force to receive prioritized contractor support.

CHAPTER FIVE

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The consolidation of redundant contract support functions would help cross capability gaps, thereby making the military a more efficient fighting force. Consolidated CAPs make sense and would positively impact combat operations. The path toward consolidation, however, is long and gradual. Long-term improvement in civil augmentation requires incremental planning and execution. Specifically, there are identified needs for unified doctrine and an enhanced ability for combatant commanders to reach for any operational service capability. Can the consolidation of CAPs imply the potential consolidation of trans-service logistical functions? Will such logistic consolidation presage an end state of joint transformation—a force capable of flexible response and unified according to function rather than by service roles? Several observers of defense trends have noted that increased jointness of the US military will evolve.

What is not understood is the process to reach that state. Retired Admiral Owens, former member of the Joint Staff, relates his views concerning future military structure.

In *Lifting the Fog of War*, he examines the information-age environment and how the military must respond to its challenges. He lauds the deliberate jointness of the modern force, but he also refers to the harm that inter-service territorialism can cause. He cites the lapse in Army-Navy communications during the 1983 invasion of Grenada:

“The historic and (military) cultural traditions that foster this separation promote an excessive and expensive redundancy, including separate medical, intelligence, and logistics organizations. And...the traditions of the forces can erode the effectiveness of joint operations and impede the synergy of true military cooperation that is essential to carrying out modern combat operations.”¹⁷²

Owens attempts to be a harbinger of military institutional reform—in the way the US military thinks and consequently how it fights.¹⁷³

Owens suggests some options in achieving long-lasting improvements in the institutional military. He describes two schools of thought regarding joint military operations: specialist and synergist. The former places service roles above joint capabilities and focuses on what each service can provide to specific missions. Owens claims the military can only move along the synergistic route, in which combatant commanders “break down artificial hierarchies and bureaucratic walls to find the most efficient combination of weapons, systems, and people.”¹⁷⁴ He leans toward the establishment of standing joint forces.¹⁷⁵ Among the author’s final recommendations is the consolidation of key military support functions, including logistics, at the DoD level.¹⁷⁶

There is cause to accelerate the process of consolidation of programs such as CAP because it will ameliorate the nation’s arsenal of military capabilities. Bell warns the military

¹⁷² Bill Owens with Ed Offley, *Lifting the Fog of War* (New York: Farrar, Straus, Giroux, 2000), 64. COL Reider recommended this text.

¹⁷³ Ibid., 69.

¹⁷⁴ Ibid., 227-8.

¹⁷⁵ Ibid., 228.

¹⁷⁶ Ibid., 234.

establishment that the post-9/11 security environment warrants strategic integration and resource coordination on a scale unseen since World War II. The inherent challenges will force DoD to rely more readily on assets—in addition to its own—from other governmental, non-governmental, and multi-national agencies. Planning and conducting operations in this environment will require “advice from a broad, global perspective complemented by an integrated, joint approach that synchronizes military activities and complements them with other instruments of national power, nongovernmental agencies, and allies.”¹⁷⁷ Friendly-force resource availability and access must increase with the growing complexity of security issues.

For the US Department of Defense to adequately address future security challenges at home and abroad, the consolidation of civil augmentation programs is a reasonable place to start. There are two primary means of accomplishing consolidation: forming a JCAP with a robust staff composed of all services or by designating, as the GAO report suggests, a specific service as a joint contracting agency for specific operations.¹⁷⁸ Both options would entail fundamental reforms:

- ⇒ Joint doctrine revision to create a JCAP or executive agency structure for CAP.
- ⇒ Elimination of separate funding sources for service civil augmentation programs.
- ⇒ Joint training and education for contracting officers that incorporate the common and service-specific contracting requirements.
- ⇒ Increase the size of the Joint Staff to accommodate incremental consolidation. The staff would plan for future consolidation of logistic functions. Consolidating the staff by functions would also enhance its efficiency.

These recommendations would serve to streamline the current contract support structure and make it more responsive to the operational needs of the US military.

¹⁷⁷ Michael S. Bell, *The Exigencies of Global, Integrated Warfare: The Evolving Role of the CJCS and his Dedicated Staff* (Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute, May 2004), 12.

¹⁷⁸ GAO, 25. Refer to Footnote 129 in “Services Already Function Together.”

There are significant ramifications to CAP consolidation. Besides the effects of organizational centralization previously discussed, consolidation may apply to other domains. For example, a JCAP that enhances military effectiveness in the theater may lead to critical consideration of consolidating other logistic and institutional support functions: medical, fuel, acquisition, education. Taken a step further, more efficient logistics structures could eventually provoke discussion of joint operational forces that would be supported by a consolidated support base. To address current and future security threats with limited resources, the consolidation of civil augmentation programs is a reasonable start point for progress.

APPENDIX A: CAP FUNCTIONS¹⁷⁹

LOGCAP (Army)	Supply operations, clothing exchange, mortuary affairs, billeting, facilities management, information management, transportation, engineering, field services, disposal of hazardous materials, recreation, signal support, power generation and distribution
AFCAP (Air Force)	Deployed management/services, airfield support, infrastructure support, recreation services, materiel support, restoration, environmental services
CONCAP (Navy & Marines)	<i>Horizontal/Vertical</i> Engineering—runways, roads, bridges, causeways, piers, berthing/messing facilities, depots, warehouses, clinics, maintenance facilities, ammunition dumps, communications facilities; <i>Specialty Engineering</i> —dredging, aerial photography, soils surveys, power generation, POL facilities, environmental restoration, concrete/asphalt production
Proposed JCAP (Common CAP Capabilities)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ⇒ Humanitarian Assistance Support ⇒ Construction—ammunition storage, airfield paving, living quarters, roads, camps, medical facilities, recreational facilities ⇒ Basic Needs—food & water services, laundry, showers ⇒ Infrastructure—power generation & distribution, sanitation ⇒ Security—personnel and key nodes ⇒ Communications ⇒ Procurement ⇒ Transportation ⇒ Maintenance & support ⇒ Recreation—physical training & religious facilities

¹⁷⁹ Peter J. Higgins, “Civilian Augmentation of Joint Operations” (4 pages, on-line: <http://www.almc.Army.mil/alog/issues/JanFeb03/MS870.htm>). In accord with this paper’s scope, other CAPs such as CRAF and WRM are not included. Higgins provides an overview of current CAP capabilities; the author synthesized the proposed JCAP capabilities.

APPENDIX B: PROPOSED JOINT CAP DOCTRINE

Current joint doctrine does not adequately integrate the service civil augmentation programs. If a joint civil augmentation program (JCAP) were implemented, a proposed revision to Chapter V, “Contractors in the Theater,” of *Joint Publication 4-0* follows.

Section 2b (pages V-1, 2), “External Theater Support Contractors,” would read:¹⁸⁰ External theater support contractors, working pursuant to contracts awarded under the Joint Civil Augmentation Program Agency (JCAPA), provide support for deployed operational forces. These may be US or third country businesses or vendors. These contracts are usually prearranged, but the theater Joint Contracting Office (JCO) may award or modify contracts according to the combatant commander’s needs. Examples include the JCAP, Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF), and War Reserve Materiel (WRM) contracts.

The JCAPA awards these contracts to support US forces and agencies in operations worldwide. The JCAP contracts provide several services that support operations. These services include, but are not limited to, road construction, airfield construction and operations, dredging, stevedoring, transportation services, mortuary services, billeting, food services, prison facilities, and decontamination. The JCAPA is organized under the J-4 of the Joint Staff and consists of the following functional areas to provide this support: Construction/Engineering, Base Support, Utilities, Security, Communications, Procurement, Transportation, Maintenance, and Recreation Management.

The Joint Civil Augmentation Program Agency has a primary role in facilitating cooperation between the Department of Defense and other governmental agencies and national forces. JCAPA is the control node that links the Joint Staff to theater JCOs, service departments,

¹⁸⁰ Please note that some original verbage is copied, some paraphrased, and some deleted for the purposes of the proposed edition.

civilian government agencies, and coalition/allied defense ministries for the purpose of providing all types of responsive contract support in theaters of operation.

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